ABSTRACT PHR System is a favorable platform for personal health information exchange. In order to ensure that the personal information is not falsified and leaked by malicious users, we use the attributebased signcryption technology to provide secure and reliable data protection. At the same time, in order to prevent users from accessing the data in the system by collusion of attributes, we proposes a revocable cloud-assisted attribute-based signcryption scheme which using the broadcast encryption technology and key segmentation technology realize user revocation function. Moreover, the proposed scheme is proven to be confidentiality and unforgeability under chosen plaintext attack in the random oracle model. And the experimental evaluation indicates that the proposed scheme is practical and feasible.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of medical information technology, Personal Health Record (PHR) system is gradually developing and improving. PHR system is a health record storage service system, which allows patients to create, control and share their HR data with a wide range of target users, including doctors, nurses, health insurance providers and family members. In order to improve the quality of PHR services at a lower cost, PHR service providers want to store PHR users' personal medical data on cloud servers. However, it will bring a series of security and privacy issues about patients' personal health information. For example, malicious users may obtain unauthorized data and modify it before authorized users (such as doctors) access it. This may lead to misdiagnosis of patients and wrong treatment of patients. Therefore, when sharing PHR data with other users, we should also ensure that PHR data is not forged or leaked. Therefore, how to securely share or store PHR data in a PHR system is an important problem.
To solve the above problems, it is essential to have robust cryptographic mechanism which is able to provide finegrained data access control with confidentiality, authenticity
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Chien-Ming Chen. and anonymity, simultaneously. At present, Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [1] - [3] is an encryption system with finegrained access control recognized by the cryptography community. In addition, public key encryption technology has also developed greatly in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) [4] - [8] . At the same time, Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) [9] - [12] has become an effective way to sign messages without revealing the identity of the signer. In recent years, many scholars have also studied the issue of the secure authentication protocol, such as Wang et al. [13] and Chen et al. [14] presented a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol which are used in IIoT environment. Xiong et al presented an efficient and provably secure certificateless parallel key-insulated signature for IIoT environments [15] - [18] . In addition, Xiong et al. [19] introduces a scalable and forward secure privacy-preserving scheme in the cloud-assisted internet of things. Therefore, we use ABE and ABS combined Attribute-Based Signcryption (ABSC) [20] - [22] to provide safe and reliable guarantee for PHR data. In addition, due to the inevitability of users' right modification and key leakage, etc, attribute-based signcryption system should consider the issue of efficient user revocation [23] .
In order to realize the function of user revocation while ensuring efficiency, we proposes a revocable cloudassisted attribute-based signcryption scheme based on [24] . This scheme, using the attribute authority to update the key periodically, realize the function of user revocation for the first time in the attribute-based signcryption scheme. The scheme also uses key segmentation technology and the trusted third-party server to assist the signature, so as to reduce the computational overhead incurred by the user when performing the signcryption operation. Moreover, we demonstrate the security proof of confidentiality and unforgeability to ensure the security of the scheme, and show the feasibility of the scheme through further analysis of communication and computational overhead. And the specific system model and System schematic is illustrated in FIGURE. 1 and FIGURE. 2. 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, In order to the attribute-based signcryption system can satisfy the needs of various application scenarios, we analysis the related research on the user revocation mechanism in the existing attribute-based cryptosystem scheme and apply it to the attribute-based signcryption system. We first present a novel revocable cloud-assisted signature attributebased signcryption (RCS-ABSC) scheme in the cloud-based PHR system which is realized by using the broadcast encryption technology [25] and key splitting technology [26] . That is, the revoked users in the system can neither sign messages nor decrypt messages. The main contributions as follows:
1) The RCS-ABSC scheme is the first time to implement revocation function in attribute-based signcryption scheme. In particular, the communication and computing costs of our scheme are close to those of Rao's scheme [24] , but compared with Rao's scheme [24] , it adds user revocation function, which shows that our scheme is feasible. 2) In order to reduce the computation overhead of signcryption in user side, we use the trusted third-party server to assist signature. 3) We also demonstrate the security proof of confidentiality and unforgeability to ensure the security of the scheme, and shows the feasibility of the scheme through further analysis of communication and computational overhead.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : In section II, we introduced the preliminaries, and described the system model and security model of our RCS-ABSC scheme.
In section III, we descirbed the specific algorithm of our scheme. Subsequently, the security proof and performance analysis of RCS-ABSC scheme are given in section IV and section V, respectively. In section VI, we mode a conclusion of this paper.
C. RELATED WORK 1) BROADCAST ENCRYPTION
The broadcast encryption schemes [27] - [31] allow the sender to specify the receiver group when encrypting. Readers may want to know if we can only use a public-key broadcast encryption system instead of ABE in the case when the sender knows the revocation list by simply specifying all non-revoked users as the receiver group. The answer is that we cannot, since we focus on the attribute-based setting, which means that the sender is supposed not to even know whose access policy will match the attribute set associated to ciphertext. In addition, Xiong et al [15] , [32] proposed a partially policy-hidden attribute-based broadcast encryption scheme which can protect the privacy information of the data user well. For KP-ABE, a direct revocation method is, however, not possible yet for the normal present form of KP-ABE algorithm since a normal KP-ABE scheme allows just specifying attribute set associated to the ciphertext, not access policy. Golläe et al. [33] proposed a directly revocable KP-ABE which is heuristic and works only when the number of attributes associated to each ciphertext is exactly half of the universe size. On the other hand, for CP-ABE, such direct revocation can be done by using ABE that supports negative clauses, proposed by Ostrovsky et al. [34] . To do so, one just adds conjunctively the AND of negation of revoked user identities (where each is considered as an attribute here).
2) SERVER-AIDED TECHNOLOGY
''Server-aided computation'' was first proposed by Matsumoto et al. [35] to speed up the computation, where a powerful server is applied to help the low-power devices execute VOLUME 7, 2019 heavy cryptographic operations. As a desirable solution to reduce computational overheads, server-aided computation has been widely used in various schemes to help with heavy calculations in the algorithms including key computation, signature generation, signature verification, encryption, decryption, and so on [36] . For example, server-aided signature [37] was proposed to reduce the exponentiation and pairing calculations. In addition, in order to improve the efficiency of system, Xiong et al. [38] proposed an outsourced attributebased encryption scheme, and the scheme has better verifiability and scalability. In addition to reduce the computational overheads, the server-aided technique has also been utilized for efficient user revocation (e.g., [26] ), where a semi-trusted server immediately terminates partial decryption operations for revoked users. Compared to the traditional revocation methodology, such an approach does not require the private key of users to be updated regularly, and greatly simplifies the revocation operation, but it does not allow the server to collude with the users. Recently, Xiong et al [39] presents a server-aided attribute-based signature for industrial internet of things.
3) ATTRIBUTED-BASED SIGNCRYPTION
In 2010, Gagne et al. [20] proposed the first ABSC scheme which can support threshold access policy. However this scheme [20] has a restriction that the signing access structure of the signcryptor needs to be fixed in the setup phase.
To solve this problem, in 2011, Emura et al. [9] gave the definition of dynamic ABSC, where the access structure of signcryptor can be updated flexible without re-issuing secret keys of users. In 2012, Chen et al. [40] investigated the combination of ABS and ABE, and give a general construction of combined ABSC schemes from combined ABE and ABS schemes. In 2013, Wang et al. [41] show that the threshold ABSC scheme in [20] is not secure and give a concrete forgery attack. Han et al. [42] propose a threshold ABSC scheme with constant-size ciphertext by employing Innerproduct encryption. In 2015, Liu et al. [43] proposed an attribute-based signcryption scheme for PHR system, which has a expressive access structure, but does not provide public authentication. In 2017, Rao [24] proved that the security of scheme [43] was incorrect, and proposed a CP-ABSC scheme for PHR system. This scheme not only provides the function of public verification, but also guarantees the confidentiality, authenticity of the data and the privacy protection of the signer. However, due to the large number of bilinear pairings and exponential operations involved in the process of decryption, the efficiency of user decryption is greatly reduced.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR MAP
Let G be a group of a prime order p with a generator g. 
where a, b ∈ R Z p , and g is the generator of a group G 1 of order p, which is a prime of length approximately l. We say that (t, )−CDH assumption holds in G 1 if there is no adversary A that runs within time t and solves CDH problem with probability at least .
C. PREDICATES

Definition 2:
We use A to be the universe of attributes. A predicate (over A) is a monotone boolean function whose inputs are related to the attributes of A. An attribute set U ∈ A is said to satisfy a predicate (or accepts L) if (U ) = 1. Here an input is set to be 1 (i.e., true) if its corresponding attribute is a member of U . Otherwise, the input is set to be 0 (i.e., false) if its corresponding attribute is not a member of U . If U doesn't satisfy , we denote it by (U ) = 0.
Since the predicate is monotone, (L) = 1 indicates
Assuming is a predicate. L denotes the set of attributes utilized in . Then the corresponding MSP for is a labeled matrix = (M l×n , ϕ), where ϕ : [l] → L is a labeling of the rows of M by attributes from L .
We define
, where U ⊂ A represents an attribute set.
A predicate (with its = (M l×n , ϕ)) accepts an input attribute set U by the following criterion as stated in Eq. (4) .
Hence,
The following result is very useful to present the security proof of the CP-OABSC scheme which will be proposed in section 3.6. Lemma 1: Let , U be a predicate and attribute set, respectively. If (U ) = 0, then there exists a vector Unforgeability: The formal definition of unforgeability is based on the following game involving a challenger C and an adversary F. 1) Setup: C selects a security parameter λ ∈ N and runs Setup algorithm. It obtains the master key MK and sends the public parameters PK to F. Definition 4: A RCS-ABSC scheme is considered to be secure against existential unforgeability, if no PPT F can win the security game with a non-negligible advantage.
III. CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we present a revocable cloud-assisted attribute-based signcryption(RCS-ABSC) scheme. The function of user revocation is a combination of broadcast encryption technology [29] and key splitting technology [26] .
In this construction, both the signing end encryption predicates are represented by MSPs. In MSP χ = (M , ρ), it is assumed that the row labeling function ρ is injective, that is, all the attributes associated with the rows of the matrix M are different. In addition, we adopt a one-time symmetric-key encryption scheme with key space φ = {0, 1} ι and message space M = {0, 1}
* that can be defined as SE = (SE-Enc, SEDec). Here, we take the tuple ∃ = (p, G 1 , G 2 , e) as a bilinear group. The remaining algorithms are described as follows.
Setup (1 λ ): The algorithm first picks a random generator g ∈ G and a random α ∈ Z * p . It computes g i = g (α i ) ∈ G for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n + 2, . . . , 2n and sets = e(g, g) α . Next, it randomly picks β ∈ Z * p and sets v = g β ∈ G. It then chooses three cryptographic collision resistent hash functions
3) The system public parameters PK and master key MK are given by
On input the public parameter PK , the master key MK and a data owner index id s ∈ U s and an attribute set A s ∈ A. It randomly samples t s , t u , b ∈ Z * p where T = t s + t u , and computes 2) It randomly chooses a vector (
3) It samples t ← Z * p and re-randomizes the signing key TK id s ,A s as follows:
It outputs the partial signature S = (χ s , M , S 2 , S 3 ). 
USign(PK ,
s = 0 n s and computes
Finally, it outputs the signatureS = (χ e , M ,S 2 ,S 3 ). e be the ith row of the matrix M e . When a data owner is intended to signcrypt a message m, he/she first needs to send a request to the server to query partial signing key TK id s ,A s . The serve would update transformation signing keys periodically. If the server finds that there is no id s of the person in the revocation list U s , it will send the partial signing key to the data owner. Then, the data owner will use
In addition, the data owner encryption is done with the symmetric-key encryption algorithm (such as AES), SE-Encryption using the key derivation function KDF.
1) It picks δ ← Z * p and sets λ = (s, ϕ 2 , . . . , ϕ n e ), here ϕ 2 , . . . , ϕ n e ← Z * p .
2) It now computes the following terms
s ,
The ciphertext is CT χ e = (χ e , E 0 , When a PHR user intends to access a PHR file, he/she sends the request to the cloud server. The server sends back the corresponding data file of the form D := (CT χ e , χ s ) to the user using SSH protocol. If the PHR user has the privilege to access the file, he/she can decrypt and view the message m as described subsequently.
The PHR user executes this algorithm with the input. The algorithm first checks the current timett. Assume that is a predefined time limit for message decryption. Iftt − tt > or χ e (A d ) = 1, it returns ⊥. Otherwise (that is,tt − tt ≤ and χ e (A d ) = 1, it verifies the ciphertext and decrypts the message. Note that χ s = (M s , ρ s ) and χ e = (M e , ρ e ), where M s (resp.M e ) is an l s × n s (resp.l e × n e ) matrix. Let M
e ) be the ith row of the matrix M s (resp.M e ).
1) It randomly samples 2 , . . . , n s ← Z * p and computes
3) It then proceeds in the following way in order to recover the PHR. a) Check the validity of the ciphertext CT χ e using the equation
if it is invalid, return ⊥, otherwise, proceed as follows. 
Remark 2 (Public Verifiability):
The validity of a signcrypted ciphertext can be verified using the identity stated in Eq.(4) based only on the system public parameters and the ciphertext terms. Hence any user who has access to the ciphertext can verify the integrity and validity of the sender and the ciphertext. This makes our scheme publicly verifiable signcryption scheme.
Using this test, either cloud or PHR user can detect whether the ciphertext has modified or not during transmission and hence authenticity of ciphertext is achieved. This is one of the essential security goals of the attribute-based PHR sharing system.
A. CORRECTNESS
If |tt − tt| ≤ and χ e (A d ) = 1, the PHR user can verify the ciphertext and recover the message correctly as explained VOLUME 7, 2019 subsequently. We have that
where
This exhibits the correctness of Eq. (4). The following argument establishes the correctness of Eq. (5).
,
Finally, the computation SE-Decrypt(KDF( s ||S 1 ||tt), E 2 ) yields the correct message M .
IV. SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 1 (Confidentiality): Suppose the security of Rao's scheme in [24] is guaranteed, then the proposed scheme is secure.
Proof 1: Assume an adversary A with non-negligible advantage can attack the above RCS-ABSC scheme. Similarly, the scheme in [24] can also be attacked by an algorithm S with non-negligible advantage.
Let C be the challenger associated with S in the selectively CPA-secure game of Rao's scheme in [24] . S runs A to execute the following steps. 1) Setup: C executes Setup algorithm in [24] to get the public parameters
and sends it to S. Then, S runs Setup algorithm in this paper to get the public parameters
Finally, it gives PK to A. 2) Query Phase 1: Firstly, S initializes an empty . So, in the view of the data owner, it is similar between cloud computing center and users. Finally, S will set
3) Challenge Phase: A sends S the challenge access policy χ * e , then S picks two (equal length) messages m 0 , m 1 and sends them to C to obtain a challenge ciphertext SCT χ e = (χ e , E 0 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , tt) by running Signcryption algorithm of [24] . Finally, S sends SCT χ e to A as its challenge ciphertext. 4) Query Phase2: A requests a second series of queries, S answers these queries in the same way as it simulated in Query Phase 1, and returns the answer as Query Phase 1. 5) Guess: A outputs its guess b. S also outputs b. According to the above discussion, if A can attack our RCS-ABSC scheme in the selectively CPA-secure model with non-negligible advantage. Similarly, A can attack the scheme in [24] .
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability): The RCS-ABSC scheme in this paper is unforgeable under the assumption of CDH.
Proof 2: Suppose an adversary F can break the scheme of this paper with non-negligible advantage, then an algorithm B can be built to solve the CDH problem. Given {g, g x , g y } as a random CDH instance, the purpose of B is to output g xy such that x, y are selected from Z * p at random. 1) Setup: The simulator B sets (g 1 = E 1 = g x , g 2 = y 0 = g y ) and delivers (g, g 1 , g 2 ) to F as the public key. 
According to our setting,
can be calculated as the solution of the given CDH instance.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. THEORETICAL COMPARISON
In this section we theoretically evaluate the performance of the proposed RCS-ABSC scheme in terms of communication cost and computation complexity as well as functionality and access policy. Since the RCS-ABSC scheme realizes the user revocation function based on the scheme [24] , the scheme focuses on comparison with the scheme [24] . In addition, since the RCS-ABSC scheme is the first time to implement revocation function in attribute-based signcryption scheme, the selected scheme '' [44] + [45] '' is compared with our scheme. At the same time, since the user revocation function in the RCS-ABSC scheme is implemented by using the broadcast encryption technology [25] and the key splitting technology [26] . Therefore, the scheme [25] , [26] is compared with our scheme. The comparison results are shown in TABLE 1 and TABLE 2 . As shown in TABLE 1, the schemes are compared and analyzed in terms of function and computational overhead. Firstly, from the perspective of the expressiveness of the access policy, both the RCS-ABSC scheme and scheme [24] use MSP as the access structure, the scheme [26] uses the access structure of the threshold strategy, and the scheme '' [44] + [45] '' [25] use LSSS as the access structure. Compared with the access structure of the threshold policy, MSP and LSSS are more flexible and rich in the expression of access policies, so they have higher practicability. Secondly, from the perspective of revocation function, the scheme [24] does not provide the revocation function, the scheme [26] provides an indirect revocation function for the user's signature operation, and the scheme [25] provides a direct revocation function for the user's encryption operation, and the combination scheme '' [44] + [45] ''implements the user's direct revocation function, and the RCS-ABSC scheme implements the revocation function for the user through the hybrid revocation method. Since the key update is very likely to become a bottleneck of system performance in the case of a large number of users, the direct revocation can avoid the communication cost and computational burden caused by the key update algorithm. Therefore, the realization of revocation function in the RCS-ABSC scheme is a compromise way scheme. Lastly, comparing the computational overhead, since signcryption and designcryption operations are not involved in the scheme [25] , [26] , no comparison is made here. From the data in the table, it can be analyzed that the calculation cost of the signcryption and designcryption of the RCS-ABSC scheme is slightly lower than the scheme [24] , but much lower than the combination scheme '' [44] + [45] ''. Therefore, the RCS-ABSC scheme is not only functionally superior to most of the existing attribute-based signcryption schemes, but also close to the existing work in terms of efficiency.
As shown in TABLE 2, the RCS-ABSC scheme and the scheme [24] '' [44] + [45] '' [25] , [26] are analyzed in terms of communication overhead. From the data in the table, we can see that the signing key and decryption key of the our scheme are almost the same as that of the scheme [24] , [26] , and much smaller than that of the scheme '' [44] + [45] ''. In addition, since the scheme periodically updates the signature key by means of a trusted third party server. Therefore, it will inevitably lead to an increase in its communication overhead and computational overhead. In summary, compared with most existing attribute-based signcryption schemes, the RCS-ABSC scheme not only has a expressive access structure, but also provides user revocation function. At the same time, its computational and communication overhead are closely to Rao's [24] scheme and much lower than ''signing then encryption'' scheme.
B. EXPERIMENTAL SIMULATION
In order to evaluate the performance of our scheme, we implement our scheme in software based on a laptop equipped with an Intel i3 − 380 processor running at 2.53GHz and 8GB memory. Furthermore, our scheme was implemented in java with JPBC library 2.0.0, and set the size of G 1 and Z * p to 64B (512bits), as well as, we set the size of G 2 to 128B (1024bits). Through the above settings, we can get the results that a pairing operation costs 647ms; an exponentiation operation in G 1 and G 2 costs 66ms and 13ms respectively.
As the result of the theoretical analysis above, it is obvious from Fig.3(a) that the computation cost of the signcryption of the RCS-ABSC scheme is lower than that of the scheme [24] '' [44] + [45] ''. Because the RCS-ABSC scheme generates partial signature by a trusted third cloud server, it reduces the computation of users at the signcryption side. As can be seen from Fig.3(b) , the computation cost of the our scheme and scheme [24] at the signcryption side is very close. Overall, we can see that on the basis of providing user revocation function, the efficiency of this scheme is not much lower than that of the comparative scheme, but far lower than that of the combined scheme'' [44] + [45] ''. Therefore, this scheme is innovative and feasible.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to solve the problem of user revocation in the attribute-based signcryption scheme, we study the attributedbased signcryption scheme proposed by Rao's scheme [24] , and present an efficient and secure RCS-ABSC scheme that supports a user revocation mechanism. At the same time, our scheme has almost the same efficiency to Rao's [24] scheme. Note that it is the first revocable attributed-based signcryption scheme in the literature. Furthermore, we prove the security of our system in the random oracle model. Finally, the experimental evaluation result demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure and feasible.
